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1.   Introduct i on
I n r ecent  year  t here has been a r enew ed i nt erest  am ong econom i sts i n t he possibl e connecti ons bet w een a 
count r y’s econom i c perf orm ance and  t he  social  and  pol i t i cal  condi t i ons  t hat   prevail   t here.  Mu c h   of  t he  i nt erest 
i s a consequence of research in econom i c grow t h,  and t he econom i c m odel  in w hi ch social and pol i t i cal 
f actors are em bedded i s typi call y root ed in t he t heory of long run grow t h.  The f ocus of the t heoreti cal 
att enti on has been on t he steady state;  and,   since t i me - varyi ng  dat a on  pol i t i cal  f actors i s seldom   avail able on 
a m ont hl y or  quart erl y basi s,  em pir i cal  wo r k has f ocussed on cross-count r y r egressions usi ng t he panel   dat a 
sets const r uct ed by  t he  Wo r l d  Bank.
The r esearch based on t hese cross-count r y st udi es indi cates that  t here are str ong corr elati ons 
bet w een count r i es’  l ong  r un  grow t h  r ates and  t hei r   pol i t i cal  characteri sti cs.  These characteri sti cs i ncl ude  such 
f actors as the degree of dem ocracy, the degree to w hi ch civi l  and pol i t i cal ri ght s are respected and the 
i nci dence  of  pol i t i cal  vi ol ence.  On e   expl anati on  f or  t hese  corr elati ons  i s t hat   t he  absence of  dem ocracy or  civi l  
and pol i t i cal ri ght s, or the presence of pol i t i cal vi ol ence, ma y  i ncrease the ri sks associated w it h l ong t erm 
i nvest me n t  and so depress capit al accum ulati on and l abor product i vi t y.  They m ay also disrupt  econom i c 
acti vi t y  or  di stort   f actor  all ocati on,   again  r educi ng  f actor  product i vi t y.   Al esina  and  Per ot t i   [ 1994]  survey  m any 
of the papers out l i ni ng t hese i deas; recent addi t i ons t o t he l i t erature i ncl ude Eas t erl y and Levi ne [ 1997]  and 
Fedderke and Kl i t gaard [ 1998].   Wh i l e di f f erent  papers f i nd di f f erent  sociopol i t i cal  i ndi cators t o be signi f i cant 
i n expl aini ng vari ati ons i n grow t h r ates across count r i es,  t here i s a consensus t hat   a subst anti al  f r acti on  of  t he 
vari ati on  i s t o  be  expl ained  by  t he  qual i t y  of  a count r y' s pol i t i cal  system .
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Wh a t ever the precise nature of the l i nk bet we e n  p o l i t i cal characteri sti cs and long run grow t h,  thi s 
wo r k does not  di r ectl y address the quest i on of  wh e t her an indi vi dual  count r y can imp r ove i t s invest me n t  
perf orm ance by i mp r ovi ng t he qual i t y of i t s pol i t i cal system . No - one seri ousl y cl aims  t hat  the causal li nk 
bet w een poli t i cal and econom i c perf orm ance is hom ogenous t hroughout  the W orl d,  so slope coeff i cients on 
pol i t i cal vari ables in cross-count r y regressions are to be i nt erpreted as the m ean eff ect on econom i c
perf orm ance of  a cert ain pol i t i cal  characteri sti c,  across count r i es i n t he sam ple.
2  He r e t he pot enti al  val ue of 
econom et r i c evidence  on  i ndi vi dual   count r i es usi ng  t i me - seri es dat a -   we r e i t   avail able -   w oul d  be  very  hi gh.
On e   count r y f or  wh i ch t i me - seri es dat a on i ndi cators of  pol i t i cal  stabil i t y do exist,   and i n wh i ch t hese 
i ndi cators have  exhi bi t ed a l arge  degree of  vari abil i t y  i n  r ecent  years,  i s I srael.
3  I n  t hi s paper  we   wi l l   const r uct  
a m acro-econom et r i c m odel  of t he Israeli  econom y condi t i oned on i ndi ctors of pol i t i cal stabil i t y t hat
corr espond  t o  som e of  t hose  used  i n  cross-secti onal   analyses.  
Ho we v e r ,  the ai m o f  thi s paper is not  j ust  t o provi de som e t i me - seri es evidence t o com pl em ent 
existi ng cross-secti on w ork.  Econom et r i c m odel i ng of t he i m pact of pol i t i cal i nst abil i t y and vi ol ence on
econom i c perf orm ance can i nform  publ i c pol i cy i n t wo   wa y s .   Fi r st,   i t   can provi de an esti ma t e of t he size of 
t he  “peace di vi dend”,   t he  m agni t ude  of  t he  i ncrease i n  aggregate i ncom e  t hat   i s l i kel y  t o  ensue f r om   an end  t o,  
or at least reduct i on i n,  pol i t i cal inst abil i t y.  The s i ze of thi s expected divi dend ought  to be one factor in 3
det ermi ni ng t he am ount  of resources devot ed to achieving pol i t i cal stabil i t y by t he st ate (and al so by t he 
i nt ernat i onal   com m uni t y).
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Second,  it  is possibl e to di sti ngui sh betw een the econom i c im pact of pol i t i cal acti vi t y by ant i - state
groups (i n t he case of Israel,  those associated wi t h t he Pal esti ni an cause)  and t he econom i c i m pact  of  t he 
state response t o such acti vi t y (m easures taken against  Pal esti ni an groups and dem onst r ators).  I f  t he
econom i c costs associated wi t h t he f orme r   are l arge and t hose associated wi t h t he l att er  are sm all   t hen i t   i s 
l i kel y  t o  be  i n  t he  i nt erests of  t he  state t o  pursue mo r e Dr aconi an securi t y  m easures.  I f ,   on  t he  ot her  hand,   t he 
econom i c costs associated wi t h t he state r esponse are also signi f i cant  t hen i t   i s l i kel y t o be i n t he i nt erests of 
t he st ate t o  pursue a negot i ated sett l em ent  wi t h  i t s opponent s.
We   ought   t o str ess at  t he out set  t hat   i t   i s l i kel y t hat   our  m easures of  pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y are l i kel y t o 
pi ck up  onl y  a f r acti on  ( t hough  probabl y  a subst anti al  f r acti on)  of  t he  vari ance i n  aggregate dem and  caused by 
pol i t i cal  events.  We   wi l l   not   i ncl ude d u mmy   vari ables f or  part i cular  peri ods,   such as pol i t i cal  r egime   changes 
and hi gh-profi l e assassinat i ons,  because the i nt erpretati on of s u c h  d u mmi es is alw ays open t o quest i on:  we  
wi sh to restr i ct  our  set  of  expl anatory vari ables t o t hose f actors we   know  t o be l i nked t o pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y.  
( Ever y m ont h,   t here i s som e new  pol i t i cal  event  t hat   coul d have an econom i c eff ect.   To  t he extent  t hat   t hese 
events are uncorr elated w it h our m easures of inst abil i t y,  som e part  of the residual s in our equat i ons has a 
pol i t i cal  expl anati on. )   Ou r   esti ma t es of  t he i m pact  of  pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y are t herefore conservat i ve esti ma t es. 
The  ma i n poi nt   of  t he paper  i s t hat   even t he conservat i ve esti ma t es are qui t e l ar ge.   Mo r eover,   t he  absence of 
appropri ate i nst r um ent s precludes  t he  i dent i f i cati on  of  t he  di r ect  eff ect  of  such endogenous  pol i t i cal  f actors as 
mi l i t ary expendi t ure. In t hi s sense, t he coeff i cients in our m odel  are to be i nt erpreted as reduced-f orm
coeff i ci ents.
2.   The   Inti f ada  and  Indi cators  of  Pol i t i cal  Instabi l i t y  i n  Israel
As   a consequence of  t he 1967 Ar ab-I sraeli   wa r ,   I srael  curr entl y governs t err i t ori es out side i t s 1948 borders, 
i ncl udi ng t he W est  Bank,  i. e.,  terr i t ory w est  of the Ri ver Jordan but  east  of  t he 1948 border,   and t he area 
around t he cit y of  G aza.  The  ma j ori t y of  t he popul ati on i n t hese areas i s ma d e   up of  Pal esti ni an Ar abs,  m any 
of w hom  cont est the l egit i m acy of Israeli  rul e and Jew ish sett l em ent of the t err i t ori es. In D ecem ber 1987 
t here w as a sudden upri sing ( Inti f ada)  am ongst  Pal esti ni ans in t hese areas (Per etz, 1990).  The upri sing 
consi sted of  str i kes and publ i c dem onst r ati ons,   wh i ch oft en escalated t o t he poi nt   wh e r e prot estors we r e shot  
dead by I sraeli   securi t y f orces;  l ater  t here wa s   an i ncrease i n t he num ber  pol i t i call y mo t i vat ed assassinat i ons 
and att acks on I sraeli   t arget s by Pal esti ni an param il i t ary groups,   part i cularl y  Ha ma s .   The  upri sing cont i nued 
up t o Sept em ber 1993,  wh e n  t he Israeli  G overnm ent  signed an agreem ent wi t h t he Pal esti ne Li berati on 
Or gani sati on ( t he Os l o Peace A ccord).   Thi s agreem ent  i ncl uded PLO  r ecogni t i on of  t he St ate of  I srael  and 
I sraeli  recogni t i on of the need for Pal esti ni an self-governm ent  in at  least part  of the W est  B ank and G aza 
areas.  The  pol i t i cal  str uctures envi saged  by  t he  Os l o  Peace A ccord  have  not   yet   been f ul l y  i mp l em ented,  and 4
t he pol i t i cal vi ol ence and inst abil i t y have not  ceased. Ov e r  the 12 years since the st art  of the Inti f ada  t he 
m agni t ude of  pol i t i cal  t ensions and vi ol ence has vari ed consi derably.   The  purpose  of  our  paper  i s t o  const r uct  
a m acro-econom et r i c m odel   t hat   uses t hi s vari ati on t o esti ma t e t he wa y s   i n wh i ch t he pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y has 
i m pacted on  I sraeli   econom i c perf orm ance.
Be f ore constr uct i ng a m acro-econom et r i c m odel  t hat  i ncorporates pol i t i cal inst abil i t y eff ects, it  is 
necessary t o defi ne m ore precisely,  and t o m easure, those t i me - varyi ng characteri sti cs of  t he I sraeli   pol i t y 
t hat  mi ght  be associated w it h t he evol ut i on of the m acro-econom y.  Pol i t i cal vi ol ence and inst abil i t y mi ght  
i mp a i r   m acroeconom i c perf orm ance t hrough t wo   channels.  Fi r st  ( but   l ess i m port antl y f or  I srael  as a w hol e),  
t he i nst abil i t y mi ght   di r ectl y di srupt   product i on,   ma k i ng i t   mo r e di f f i cult   f or  busi nesses t o open or  f or  wo r kers 
t o get   t o wo r k.   The  di srupt i on mi ght   be a r esult   of  str i kes,   curf ew s,  mo r e str i ngent   i dent i t y checks or  j ust   t he 
physi cal  i m possibi l i t y of  econom i c acti vi t y i n t he presence of  pol i t i cal  vi ol ence.  As   a consequence t here mi ght  
be l ow er  product i vi t y ( because capit al  i s not   used t o capacit y)  or  hi gher  unem pl oym ent   ( because l abor  i s l ess 
m obi l e).   Ci r cum stanti al  evidence f or  such eff ects i n t he We s t   Bank i s presented i n R azin and Sadka [ 1993].  
They  not e t hat   i n 1988 t he average num ber  of  wo r k-days per  m ont h i n t he We s t   Bank and G aza areas wa s
onl y 75. 6%  of the pre-Inti f ada f i gure.  By  1990 t he average num ber  of  wo r k-days per  m ont h wa s   sti l l   onl y 
92. 6%  of  t he pre-Inti f ada  f i gure.  Ho we v e r ,   t he  econom y  of  t he  We s t   Bank  and  G aza areas cont r i but es onl y 
a sm all   f r acti on t o t he t ot al  GDP  of  I sraeli - cont r ol l ed t err i t ory,   and  t he  di srupt i on  of  t hi s ki nd  caused i n  I srael 
proper  has  been t r i vi all y  sm all .
Second,  the i nst abil i t y m i ght  increase the perceived ri sk of doi ng busi ness in Israel.  Thi s eff ect is 
pot enti all y mo r e i m port ant  t han t he f i r st,   because i t   appl i es t o t he w hol e of  I sraeli - governed t err i t ory and not  
j ust   t he  We s t   Bank  and  G aza areas.  I ncreased r i sk mi ght   be  associated wi t h  l ow er  aggregate dem and  ( hi gher 
precauti onary saving and/ or  l ow er  f i xed capit al  i nvest me n t ) ,   so t hat   i ncreased pol i t i cal   i nst abil i t y  i s associated 
wi t h busi ness cycle t r oughs.   The  r i sk t o consum ers and i nvest ors mi ght   be ma n i f ested t hrough a num ber  of 
channels:
1.   The  possibi l i t y  of  i nj ury  t o  person  or  propert y  i n  param il i t ary  att acks;
2.   The  possibi l i t y  of  t he  upri sing spreading  t o  Ar ab I sraeli s,
5  w ho  becam e mu c h   mo r e pol i t i cized i n  t he 
1980s  ( Ma y e r ,   1988;   Rouhana,   1989,   1991);  
3.   For   Ar ab I sraeli s,  t he  possibi l i t y  of  l osi ng  propert y  r i ght s as a r esult   of  I sraeli   securi t y  m easures.
I n t hi s paper  we   wi l l   draw  on t i me   seri es dat a capturi ng  som e of  t he  elem ents of  pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y  i n  order  t o 
i nvest i gat e the w ays i n w hi ch pol i t i cal inst abil i t y i s corr elated w it h m acroeconom i c acti vi t y.  The choice of 
pol i t i cal  t i me   seri es i s mo t i vat ed by  t he  r esult s of  r ecent  em pir i cal  evidence  gat hered by  pol i t i cal  sociol ogi sts i n 
I srael.
Rouhana and Fi ske [ 1995]  use f actor  analysi s of  i ndi vi dual   survey dat a t o expl ore t he characteri sti cs 
of  I sraeli   society and pol i t i cs t hat   evoke a sense of  t hreat  i n survey r espondent s.  The  authors are not   di r ectl y 
concerned  wi t h  econom i c r i sk,  but   i t   i s not   unreasonabl e t o  suppose  t hat   perceived  econom i c r i sk i s corr elated 5
wi t h “t hreat” as they defi ne i t .  Ther e are 22 characteri sti cs in t hei r  quest i onnai r e; the ones evoki ng t he 
greatest  sense of  t hreat  i n  Jew ish r espondent s are:
1.   "A tt acks and  acts of  sabot age";
2.   "A rabs i n  I srael  j oi n  t he  upri sing";
The  ones  evoki ng  t he  greatest  sense of  t hreat  i n  Ar ab r espondent s are:
3.   "Expropri ati on  of  Ar ab l and";
4.   "D iscussions  about   expul sion  of  Ar abs";
I f  the i nt ensit y of these characteri sti cs increases (f or exam ple, if  the num ber of att acks increases or mo r e 
Ar ab l and i s expropri ated)  t hen percepti ons of  i nsecuri t y am ongst   Jew s and Ar abs are l i kel y t o becom e mo r e 
i nt ense.  On e   consequence of  t hi s mi ght   be  a r educt i on  i n  i nvest me n t   or  ot her  econom i c acti vi t y  by  t he  Jew ish 
or  Ar ab com m uni t i es.
Ther e are two  r eadil y avail able ti me  s e r i es m easures that  are closel y related to characteri sti cs 1-2.
Fi r st,  there are m ont hl y fi gures for the num ber of peopl e (mo s t l y Jew s)  ki l l ed i n I srael  proper  i n pol i t i call y 
mo t i vat ed att acks.  Vi ol ent  i nci dent s wi t hi n t he 1948 boundari es mi ght   be perceived as signal l i ng an i ncreased 
r i sk of the confl i ct spil l i ng over the border.  Second,  there are m ont hl y fi gures for the num ber of peopl e
( mo s t l y  Ar abs)  ki l l ed t he  We s t   Bank  and  G aza areas:  t he  num ber  of  such deaths  i s l i kel y  t o  be  corr elated wi t h 
t he i nt ensit y of  confr ont ati ons bet w een Pal esti ni ans and I sraeli   securi t y f orces /   Jew ish r esident s of  t he We s t  
Bank  and Ga z a .   B' Ts el em  [ 1999]  r eport s all   t hese  f i gures.  The  degree of  perceived  i nsecuri t y  ma y   depend  on 
eit her the num ber of deaths i n Israel proper,  or the t ot al num ber of deaths,  or bot h fi gures. Israeli  deaths 
r epresent  a di r ect  t hreat;   but   deaths  i n  t he  We s t   Bank  and  G aza ma y   also aff ect  t he  perceived  i nt ensit y  of  t he 
upri sing.
Wi t h r espect  t o characteri sti cs 3-4,   t he  I sraeli   Ce nt r al  Bur eau of  St ati sti cs publ i shes dat a det ail i ng  t he 
num ber  of  pri vat e r esident i al  bui l di ngs  f or  wh i ch const r uct i on  start ed each quart er  i n  Jew ish sett l em ents i n  t he 
We s t   Bank and G aza areas.
6  No t   all   bui l di ng i n t he We s t   Bank and G aza areas i s on expropri ated l and,   but   i t  
mi ght   we l l   be  t he  case t hat   Ar abs perceive  t he  expansi on  of  t he  We s t   Bank  and  G aza sett l em ents t o  be  at  t he 
expense of Ar ab propert y ri ght s. In t hi s case an increase in t he rate of expansi on w i l l  be l i nked t o an 
i nt ensif i cati on  of  t he  percepti ons  of  econom i c i nsecuri t y  associated wi t h  characteri sti cs 3-4.
Fi gure 1 i l l ust r ates t he t hree pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y-r elated t i me   seri es,  pl ot t ed as quart erl y  dat a f r om   t he  begi nni ng 
of  t he Inti f ada i n 1987q4.   Fat ali t i es i n t he We s t   bank and G aza are m easured as ln(1+t k)  wh e r e tki s t he 
num ber  of  deaths per  quart er;   simi l arl y,   I sraeli   f atali t i es are m easured as l n(1+i k)  wh e r e i k  i s t he  num ber  of
I sraeli   deaths per  quart er.   ( Logari t hm s are used t o create seri es t hat   are approxi ma t ely norma l l y di str i but ed. 
The  seri es ln(i k)  cannot   be  used  because t here are a f ew  quart ers i n  wh i ch no  f atali t i es occurr ed.)   The  We s t  
Bank and G aza f atali t y seri es peaks i n 1994q1 at  104 deaths;   t he I sraeli   f atali t y seri es peaks i n 1996q1 at  45 
deaths.  The f i gure also plot s pri vat e Jew ish resident i al const r uct i on st ati sti cs for We s t  B ank and G aza 
sett l em ents.  The  f i gure pl ot s t he l ogari t hm  of  t he r eport ed num ber  of  bui l di ngs  start ed, ln(c);   no dat a on t he 6
size of  dw el l i ngs  i s avail able.  Const r uct i on  peaks i n  1991q2  at  7, 310  houses.
[F igure  1  here]
I n Secti on 4 of  t he paper  we   wi l l   present  a m odel   t hat   i nvest i gat es t he str uct ure of  t he r elati onshi p bet w een 
t he pol i t i cal and social ti m es seri es discussed in t hi s secti on and vari ables that  quant i f y m acroeconom i c 
perf orm ance. The next  secti on provi des a cont ext for t hi s analysi s by gi vi ng a bri ef overvi ew  of t he 
characteri sti cs of t he Israeli  m acro-econom y over t he l ast 15 years, and of t he propert i es of I sraeli
m acroeconom i c t i me   seri es.
3.   The   Israeli   M acro-econom y
3. 1  Hi stori cal  O verview
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The  peri od l eading up t o t he start   of  t he Inti f ada was  an econom i call y  dram ati c one.A l t hough  not   hi stori call y 
suscepti bl e t o hyperi nfl at i on,   t he I sraeli   econom y began t o suff er  annual  i nfl ati on r ates at  t he t r i pl e- di gi t   l evel 
i n t he l ate 1970s,   a possibl e consequence of  l arge i nfl ow s of  mi l i t ary aid com bined wi t h f i nanci al  l i berali zati on 
all ow i ng dom est i c resident s to hol d foreign curr ency and assets in l arge quant i t i es (Fi scher,  1987).  The 
i nfl ati on  r ate cont i nued  t o  i ncrease i n  t he  earl y  1980s  ( see Fi gure 2).   Ho we v e r   i n  1985,   j ust   before t he  start   of 
t he Inti f ada,   t here wa s   a stabil i zati on  program  t hat   i mme d i ately  brought   i nfl at i on  t o  l ow   and  stable l evels.  The 
Econom i c St abil i zati on Pr ogram  ( ESP)   com pri sed a r educt i on i n t he Fi scal  defi cit   f r om  12%  of  GDP  i n mi d-
1985 t o zero by t he end of  1986,   a 19%  deval uat i on of  t he Sheqel  com bined wi t h t he i nt r oduct i on of  a f i xed 
exchange r ate peg,  a suspension of off i cial wa g e  i ndexat i on and t he (t em porary) int r oduct i on of credit  and 
f oreign exchange cont r ol s (Cuc ki erma n ,  1988;  Li vi atan, 1988;  R azin and Sadka,   1993;  Ruge- Mu r cia,  1999).  
The  ESP  i s now  cit ed as a t extbook exam ple of  a successful   stabil i zati on program  ( see f or  exam ple A génor 
and M ont i el,  1996).  Av e r age annual i zed infl ati on over the peri od 1986-1999 w as 12%  w i t h a quart er- on-
quart er  standard devi ati on of  7% .   The  m onet ary authori t i es have succeeded i n ma i nt aini ng f i nanci al  stabil i t y
over  t he  1990s,   and  have  been able gradual l y  t o  l i berali ze I sraeli   f i nanci al  ma r ket s ( Bank  of  I srael,   1999).
[F igures  2-3  here]
Ther e has also been som e looseni ng i n t he exchange rate regime  ( Fi gure 3).  Thr ough t he m i d- 1980s  I srael 
ma i nt ained an adj ust able peg regime  t hat  requi r ed fr equent  reali gnm ent s: alt hough al r eady dow n i n t he l ow  
t eens,  I srael' s i nfl ati on wa s   sti l l   hi gh r elati ve t o t hat   of  i t s i ndust r i al  t r ading part ners.  Expectati ons of  f r equent  
r eali gnm ent  coupl ed w it h a hi gh degree of capit al m obi l i t y m ade i nt erest rates extr em ely vol ati l e (We r ner,  
1995).  Mo r eover the fr equency of reali gnm ent s m eant that  the peg w as of li t t l e use as a nom inal  anchor.  
Budget   defi cit s,  and hence expansi on of  t he m oney base,   we r e successful l y r educed duri ng t hi s peri od  ( R azin 
and Sadka,   1996),   but   t hi s wa s   despi t e r ather  t han because of  t he exchange r ate r egime .   At   t he end of  t he 
decade I srael  m oved t o a t arget - zone  r egime   wi t h  an adjust able ( and  l ater  craw li ng)  t arget   band  f or  t he  val ue 7
of the Sheqel against  a tr ade-we i ght ed basket of curr encies. The band i s w ide enough t o accom m odate 
shocks  t o  t he  capit al  account,   and t he  secular  t r end i n  i t s l i mi t s accom m odates a l evel  of  I sraeli   i nfl ati on  t hat   i s 
sti l l   several  percentage poi nt s hi gher  t han t he OECD  average.  The  credibi l i t y  of  t he  r egime   i s r efl ected i n  t he 
f act  t hat   t he spot   exchange r ate has never  been close t o t he upper  l i mi t   ( i . e.,   t he mi ni mu m  possibl e val ue of 
t he Sheqel) .  Ther e is a nom i nal  anchor in t he l i mi t ed sense that  there is a not i onal  c o mmi t me n t  to pr event
extr aordi nari l y l arge shocks t o t he capit al  account   i m pacti ng on t he exchange r ate and dom est i c pri ces.  The 
exchange r ate band has becom e ever  wi der,   and t here i s now  a great  deal  of  f l exibi l i t y i n t he exchange r ate 
r egime .
The i ncrease in fi nanci al  stabil i t y has al so corr esponded t o som e i ncrease in t he st abil i t y of real 
econom i c vari ables.  Fi gure 4  show s  how   r eal  GDP  has  evol ved  over  t he  l ast  t wo   decades.  Ou t put   has  grow n 
steadil y over  t he peri od,   wi t h t he grow t h r ate i n t he l ate 1980s and earl y 1990s  a l i t t l e hi gher  t han  i n  t he  earl y 
1980s or late 1990s.  De v i ati ons around t r end are highest  in t he pre-stabil i zati on peri od:  over 1980-84 t he 
standard devi ati on of  t he l og of  quart erl y GDP  around t r end wa s   i n excess of  3% ;   t hi s i s t r ue bot h wh e n   t he 
t r end  i s assum ed t o  be  l i near  and  wh e n   som e ki nd  of  f i l t er  ( such as t he  H odri ck-Pr escott   Fi l t er)   i s used.   Ov e r  
subsequent   years t he standard devi ati on has t ypi call y been bel ow  3% ,   as show n i n Tabl e 1 and i l l ust r ated i n 
t he corr espondi ng Fi gure 5. Ne v e r t hel ess,   t here i s sti l l   a subst anti al  am ount   of  vari ati on i n r eal  out put   t o be 
expl ained.  The dr am ati c reduct i on i n t he m ean and vari ance of i nfl ati on show n i n Fi gure 2 has not
corr esponded  t o  a simi l arl y  dram ati c r educt i on  i n  out put   i nst abil i t y.
[Tabl e 1  and  Fi gures 4-5  here]
Mo r eover,   t here has been a subst anti al  am ount   of  vari ati on i n ot her  r eal  vari ables i n t he post - stabil i zati on  era. 
Tabl e 1 also show s post - stabil i zati on val ues of the st andard devi ati ons of two  o t her m acroeconom i c ti me  
seri es. These are the l og of t he unem pl oym ent  l evel (t he di f f erence betw een the econom i call y acti ve 
popul ati on and t he num ber  of  peopl e em ployed)  and of  t he l og of  t he r eal  exchange r ate p/ [s￿p*],   wh e r e s i s 
t he nom i nal   exchange r ate, p t he I sraeli   consum er  pri ce i ndex and p* a t r ade-we i ght ed average of  t he  pri ce 
i ndi ces of i ndust r i al count r i es).
8 Bot h seri es, and part i cularl y unem pl oym ent ,  have exhi bi t ed a substanti al 
degree of vari abil i t y.  O ne possibl e explanati on for thi s is that  som e of the pot enti all y benefi cial eff ects of
stabil i zati on  have  been off set  by  an i ncrease i n  pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y  as ma n i f ested i n  t he  Inti f ada.
3. 2  St at i sti cal  Propert i es of   I sraeli   M acroeconom i c and  Pol i t i cal  Var i abl es
The  m odel   t hat   wi l l   be devel oped i n t he next   secti on t o t est  t hi s hypot hesi s needs t o be i nforme d   bot h by t he 
preceding hi stori cal perspecti ve and by t he t i me - seri es propert i es of the dependent  vari ables on w hi ch the 
m odel  wi l l  focus.  These are: log real GDP,  l n(y),   l og unem pl oym ent ,  ln(u),   and t he l og r eal  exchange r ate, 
l n(e).8
Vi sual  i nspect i on of  Fi gure 4 show s t hat   t he out put   seri es i s dom i nat ed by a t r end,   but   i t   i s not   i mme d i ately 
obvi ous w het her t he t r end i s determi ni sti c or stochast i c, i . e.,  wh e t her t he seri es is tr end-stati onary or 
di f f erence-stati onary.   Pr evious papers on grow t h i n I srael,   such as Scacciavil l ani  and Sw agel  [ 1999],   are not  
able t o r eject  t he nul l   of  di f f erence stati onari t y;   but   t hese papers base t hei r   t ests on a sm all er  sam ple t han i s 
now  avail able.  Tabl e 2 show s t he r esult s of  our  t est  f or  t he nul l   t hat   l n(y)  i s di f f erence stati onary  against   t he 
alt ernat i ve t hat   i s t r end stati onary,   usi ng t he me t hod of  Di ckey and Ful l er  [ 1979].   The  t able also r eport s t he 
r esult s of  simi l ar  t ests f or ln(u)  and ln(e).   The  f i gures gi ven f or  each t i me   seri es x t   are p-val ues  f or  t he  t est 
of  t he  nul l   t hat   t he  seri es i s a r andom   wa l k  wi t h  dri f t   against   t he  alt ernat i ve  t hat   i t   i s stati onary  around  a l i near 
t r end.   The  stati sti c i ndi cates t he  l evel  of  signi f i cance of  m2  i n  t he  r egression:
( 1) ∆x t   = m0  +  m1￿t   +  m2￿x t - 1  +  Siai ⋅∆x t - i   +  ut
wh e r eu t   i s wh i t e noi se and t he l ag order  f or  ∆x t   i s chosen accordi ng t o t he Schwar t z Ba ye s i an I nforma t i on 
Cr i t eri on.   We   are usi ng a r elati vel y sm all   sam ple,  and simu l ated cri t i cal  val ues f or  t he t est  can be sensit i ve t o 
t he f orm  of  t he dat a generati ng  process assum ed under  t he  nul l .   So  i n  all   cases t he  p-val ues  are based  on  our 
ow n si mu l ated distr i but i ons for the t - r ati o on m2,   r ather  t han on t he di str i but i ons r eport ed i n t he Di ckey and 
Ful l er  paper.   These di str i but i ons are const r uct ed on 10, 000  r epli cati ons  under  t he  nul l   t hat   m1  =  m2  =  0,   and  t he 
dat a generati ng  process uses  esti ma t es f r om   t he  r egression:
( 2) ∆x t   = m0'   +  Siai ' ⋅∆x t - i   +  ut '
The s ampl e peri ods for l n(y)  and ln(u) are the l ongest  avail able w it hout  a change in t he defi ni t i on of the 
vari able;  t he sam ple peri od f or ln(e)  begi ns i n 1987,   so as t o be sure t hat   t he r eal  exchange r ate i s f r ee f r om  
t he  eff ects of  t he  hyperi nfl ati on.
The  nul l   can be r ejected at  t he 1%  l evel  f or  l n(y)  and  at  t he  5%   l evel  f or  l n(e).   For   l n(u)  t he  stati sti c 
l i es very close t o t he 5%  i nt erval .   We   wi l l   proceed on t he assum pti on t hat   all   t hree vari ables are stati onary 
around a det ermi ni sti c tr end,  subj ect to t he caveat that  it  is onl y i n t he case of l n(y) that  the nul l  of non-
stati onari t y can be r ejected at  t he 1%  l evel.
9  The  det ermi ni sti c t r ends are not   necessari l y l i near;   t he Tabl e 2 
r esult s are consistent wi t h a m ore com plex tr end t erm t han i s all ow ed for in equat i on (1),  and as Fi gure 4 
show s  standard  f i l t eri ng  t echniques  do  not   produce  a l i near  t r end  f or  l n(y).
[Tabl es 2-3  here]
Ou r  m odel  wi l l  tr eat out put ,  em ploym ent  and unem pl oym ent  as tr end st ati onary vari ables. Imp l i cit  in t hi s 
m odel  is the assum pti on t hat  the evol ut i on of product i vi t y i n t he Israeli  econom y can be descri bed by a 9
det ermi ni sti c tr end pl us st ati onary shocks.  If  the m easures of pol i t i cal inst abil i t y di scussed in t he previous 
secti on are t o be used t o expl ain changes i n product i vi t y t hen t hey also mu s t   be stati onary.   Tabl e 3 presents 
stati onari t y t est stati sti cs for t he t hree vari ables fr om  Secti on 2:  Fat ali t i es in t he W est  B ank and G aza, 
l n(1+t k),   I sraeli   f atali t i es, ln(1+i k),   and pri vat e Jew ish r esident i al  const r uct i on i n t he We s t   Bank and G aza, 
l n(c).   The  me t hod  used  i n  const r uct i ng  t he  p-val ues  f or  t he  nul l   of  non-stati onar i t y  i s t he  sam e as i n  Tabl e 2.
Thi s nul l   can be  r ejected against   t he  alt ernat i ve  of  t r end  stati onari t y  at  t he  1%   l evel  f or  l n(1+pk)and
l n(1+t k).  It  cannot  be rejected for l n(c).  Ho we v e r ,  the nul l  that  Dl n(c)  i s a r andom  wa l k can be r ejected 
against  t he al t ernat i ve t hat  i t  i s stati onary around a const ant at t he 1%  l evel.  We  w i l l  proceed on the 
assum pti on t hat  ln(1+t k) and ln(1+i k)  are t r end stati onary and t hat  ln(c)  i s di f f erence stati onary.   No t e also 
t hat   no l ags are signi f i cant  i n t he ADF  t ests f or  vari ables t hat   t urn  out   t o  be  stati onary.   Cur r ent  grow t h  i n  t he 
pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y  seri es i s not   corr elated wi t h  past   grow t h.
4.   Mo d e l i ng  t he  M acro-econom y i n  t he  Presence of  Pol i t i cal  Instabi l i t y
4. 1  An  I nt erpretat i ve Theoret i cal  M odel
The  evidence presented i n  t he  previous  secti ons  suggest s t hat   t he  I sraeli   econom y over  t he  l ast  decade and a 
hal f   has  exhi bi t ed t he  f ol l ow i ng  characteri sti cs:
1. There i s a l ow  and stable r ate of  m oney suppl y grow t h corr espondi ng t o a l ow  and stable r ate of 
i nfl ati on.   The  m oney  suppl y  i s not   used  t o  accom m odate i ncreases i n  t he  budget   defi cit .
2. The l evels of  out put   and  unem pl oym ent   are stati onary  around  a det ermi ni sti c t r end.   O nce one  has 
cont r ol l ed for the det ermi ni sti c changes in product i ve capacit y,  shocks t o out put  do not  persist
i ndefi ni t ely.
3. A l t hough stabil i zati on i n t he mi d-1980s  i nvol ved  an exchange r ate peg,   I srael  appears not   t o  have 
used t he exchange r ate as a r i gi d nom i nal   anchor.   Exchange r ate bands have wi dened over  t he 
1990s,   and t here i s a great  deal  of  f l exibi l i t y  i n  t he  nom i nal   exchange r ate.  Gi ven  t he  t i ght   cont r ol  
of  m oney and pri ce grow t h,   t hi s f l exibi l i t y i s necessary f or  achieving an external   bal ance i n t he 
presence of  shocks t o t he capit al  account .   Consequent l y,   t here has been a great  deal  of  vari ance 
i n t he  r eal  exchange r ate;  t hi s vari ance i s nevert hel ess stable over  t i me .
4. There has been a great deal of vari abil i t y i n pol i t i cal ti me  s e r i es that  mi ght  infl uence econom i c 
perf orma n c e .   I ndi cators of  pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y and vi ol ence can change r apidl y f r om  o ne  year  t o 
t he  next ,   and  seem  t o  be  enti r ely  unpredictable.
We  w i l l  esti ma t e a condi t i onal  VAR mo d e l  of the Israeli  m acro-econom y,   i n wh i ch t he dependent   vari ables 
wi l l  be aggregate out put ,  unem pl oym ent  and t he real exchange rate and the condi t i oni ng vari abl es w il l  be 
m easures of  pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y.   The  econom i c vari ables wi l l   be m easured as devi ati ons f r om  t hei r   esti ma t ed 
l ong-r un t r ends,  so any signi f i cant coeff i cient on a pol i t i cal vari able could be i nt erpreted as capturi ng t he 
eff ect of pol i t i cal i nst abil i t y on cycl i cal m ovem ent s in t he econom y.  The s i mp l e theoreti cal m acro-m odel
bel ow  i l l ust r ates how  one mi ght   i nt erpret  t he VAR  coeff i cients i n a wa y   t hat   i s consi stent  wi t h observat i ons 
( i - i v) above.  In t he absence of any obvi ous w ay t o i dent i f y t he s t r uct ural equat i ons i n t he m odel ,  we  wi l l  10
esti ma t e onl y a reduced form VAR,  so the t heoreti cal m odel  is purely i nt erpretati ve.  The purpose of the 
t heory i s t o show  t hat   t he econom et r i c m odel   we   wi l l   esti ma t e i s consi stent  wi t h a simp l e t heoreti cal  m odel .  
Ri cher theoreti cal m odel s (f or exam ple, ones w i t h w age i nert i a) are also consi stent wi t h t he econom et r i cs. 
For   t he sake of  clari t y t he t heory i s const r uct ed so as t o keep m acroeconom i c dynam i cs t o a mi ni mu m.   The 
em pir i cal  VAR  m odel   wi l l   all ow  f or  a mo r e com plex l ag str uct ure t han  i s i mp l i cit   i n  t he  t heoreti cal  m odel   t hat  
f ol l ow s  now .
The  m odel   consi sts of  t en equat i ons,   wh i ch wi l l   be solved dow n t o a r educed f orm  system  of  t hree 
equat i ons.   I t   i s simi l ar  i n styl e t o t he t heoreti cal  m odel s di scussed i n Fi scher  [ 1977]  and  Bl anchard  and  Qu a h  
[ 1989],  but  deals expl i cit l y w i t h t he real exchange rate and incorporates tr end-stati onary rather t han
di f f erence-stati onary  product i vi t y  shocks.
10  The  equat i ons  are:
( 3) ln(y)t   =  a￿[ln(m) t-   l n(p) t ]-g￿l n(e)t   +  m  t
( 4) l n(y)t   =  h￿l n(n) t   +  q  t
( 5) l n(e)t   =  l￿l n(e)t - 1-z￿l n(y)t   +  e  t
e
( 6) l n(p) t   =  l n(w) t-q  t
(7)  qt   =  f ( t )   -k￿P t   +  e  t
s
(8)  mt   =  e  t
d-n￿P   t
( 9) l n(m) t   =  l n(m) t - 1
( 10) l n(w) t   =  l n(w) t⏐  {E [l n(n) t ] =  l n(n) t *}
( 11) l n(n) t *  =  j￿l n(y)t - 1-c￿l n(u) t - 1-y￿l n(e)t - 1
( 12) l n(u) t   =  l ( t )   –l n(n) t
The  i nt erpretati on  of  t he  vari ables i s as f ol l ow s:
yt aggregate out put
mt t he  aggregate m oney  stock
pt t he  aggregate consum er    pri ce l evel
e t t he real exchange rate (i . e.,  the rati o of pt  to an average of the consum er pri ce level in Israel’ s 
t r ading  part ners,  expressed i n  Sheqels)11
q  t product i vi t y  i n  aggregate product i on
nt aggregate em ploym ent
P  t a vector  of  vari ables capturi ng  t he  m agni t ude  of  pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y
ut unem pl oym ent
wt t he  m oney  wa g e   r ate
nt *t he  nat ural  r ate of  em ploym ent
mt unant i cipat ed shif t s i n  aggregate dem and
f ( t )a   det ermi ni sti c t r end  i n  product i vi t y
l ( t )a   det ermi ni sti c t r end  r epresenti ng  t he  size of  t he  wo r ki ng  popul ati on
e  t
s stati onary  r andom   econom i c shocks  t o  product i vi t y
e  t
e stati onary  r andom   econom i c shocks  t o  t he  r eal  exchange r ate
e  t
d stati onary  r andom   econom i c shocks  t o  pri vat e sector  aggregate dem and
Equat i on (3) i s an aggregate dem and curve.  In l ogari t hm s,  aggregate dem and i s a li near funct i on of real 
m oney bal ances and the real exchange rate, but  also has a stochast i c com ponent ,m.   Cor r espondi ngl y,  
equat i on  ( 4)  i s a product i on  f unct i on:   t ot al  out put   depends  on  em ploym ent   and  product i vi t y.
Equat i on (5) expl ains t he evol ut i on of t he real exchange rate. In t he st eady st ate the nom i nal
exchange rate w il l  adjust  wi t hi n i t s band so t hat  the real exchange rate is consi stent wi t h a Bal ance of 
Paym ent s equi l i bri um ,   gi ven t he existi ng l evels of dom est i c and  f oreign  pri ces.  I f   t he  Ba l ance of  Paym ent s i s 
a negat i ve funct i on of the real exchange rate (because a higher e m eans low er com peti t i veness) and of 
dom est i c aggregate dem and ( because a hi gher y m eans mo r e dem and f or  i m port s)  t hen i n t he steady state e
wi l l  be a negat i ve funct i on of y.  Ho we v e r  for l > 0 adj ust me n t  to t he st eady st ate is not  inst antaneous. 
Shocks t o t he real exchange rate (f or exam ple, because of changes in t he foreign pri ce level)  wi l l  have an 
eff ect  on et hat   l asts f or  several  peri ods.
Equat i on ( 6)  i s a pri ce-sett i ng  equat i on  f or  f i r ms .   Equat i on  ( 7)  descri bes  t he  evol ut i on  of  product i vi t y.  
I n t he l i ght   of  t he evidence di scussed above,   we   descri be product i vi t y as t he com binat i on of  a det ermi ni sti c 
t r end and st ati onary random  com ponent .   We   also all ow  product i vi t y i s also aff ected by a vector  of  pol i t i cal 
i nst abil i t y  vari ables,  P.   Thi s i s ma d e   up of  t he t hree vari ables descri bed i n det ail   i n Secti on 2.   Ho we v e r ,   i t   i s 
unl i kel y t hat   t he ma j or  i m pact  of  pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y on I srael  as a w hol e i s t hrough a product i vi t y eff ect.   The 
ma i n eff ect is li kel y t o be t hrough aggregate dem and,   as i ndi cated by equat i on ( 8).   Equat i on ( 8)  i ndi cates a 
decom posi t i on of  aggregate dem and shocks i nt o t he econom i c com ponent ,  e  t
d,   and t he shocks t o aggregate 
dem and caused by changes i n t he pol i t i cal inst abil i t y vari ables, P.  An  i ncrease in i nst abil i t y w i l l  depress 
aggregate dem and.
Equat i on ( 9)  descri bes t he evol ut i on of  t he nom i nal   m oney stock.   The  l ong r un r ate of  grow t h of  t he 
m oney  suppl y  i s const ant  ( and  wi t hout   l oss of  generali t y  set  equal   t o  zero).   I t   w oul d  be  possibl e t o  i ncorporate 
r andom  devi ati ons around t hi s r ate wi t hout   l oss of  generali t y,   but   t hey w oul d not   be di sti ngui shable f r om  t he 
e  t
d.
Equat i ons (10-11)  descri be characteri sti cs of  t he l abor  ma r ket .   Equat i on ( 10)  states t hat   t he m oney 
wa g e ,   set  one  peri od  i n  advance,   adjust s so as t o  ensure t hat   expected l abor  dem and  equal s t he  nat ural  r ate of 12
em ploym ent .  Equat i on (10) i ndi cates that  t hi s rate depends on prevail i ng m acroeconom i c condi t i ons.
Reduct i ons  i n  out put   and  i ncreases i n  t he  r eal  exchange r ate can cause str uct ural  unem pl oym ent ,   l ow eri ng  t he 
nat ural rate; and recent increases in actual  unem pl oym ent  can reduce the nat ural rate t hrough a hyst eresis 
eff ect.  Equat i on (11) defi nes an unem pl oym ent  rate. The s i ze of the econom i call y acti ve popul ati on,  l ,   i s  
assum ed t o  f ol l ow   a det ermi ni sti c t r end.
A ssum ing  t hat   t he  econom i c shocks  e  t
i   and  pol i t i cal  shocks  P t   have  a m ean of  zero:
( 13) E[e  t
s] =  E[ e  t
d] =  E[ e  t
e] =E[ P t ] =    0
equat i ons (3-12) can be solved dow n t o  a  VAR f or out put ,  unem pl oym ent  and t he real exchange rate,
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The assum pti on t hat  changes in P can be tr eated as “unanti cipat ed” at the aggregate level is not  str i ctl y 
necessary f or  deri vi ng a r elati onshi p bet w een t he m acroeconom i c vari ables and pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y,   t hough i t  
does  i nfl uence  t he  i nt erpretati on  of  esti ma t ed r educed-f orm  param eters.  We   conj ecture t hat   i nnovat i ons  i n  t he 
num ber of att acks on Israeli s, in t he num ber of dem onst r ati ons l eading t o Pal esti ni an deaths,  and in t he 
expansi on of  r eal  estate on pri vat ely ow ned l and i n Jew ish We s t   Bank sett l em ents are acti vi t i es pl anned by a 
f ew  indi vi dual s that  com e as a shock to t he m aj ori t y of the popul ati on.  (They cert ainl y seem  to com e as a 
shock  t o  mo s t   pol i t i cians.)
Ou t put  ought  to be negat i vel y related to unem pl oym ent  and t he real exchange rate, and t hese t wo  
vari ables ought   t o be posi t i vel y r elated.  Except  i n a “perverse” case wh e r e g￿z   >  a org￿z   >  1  ( excepti onal l y 
l arge feedback betw een output  and t he real exchange rate),  pol i t i cal inst abil i t y ought  to reduce out put  and 
r aise t he r eal  exchange r ate.  The  r eal  exchange r ate eff ect  depends on a str i ctl y posi t i ve val ue of z,   wh i ch
m easures the sensi t i vi t y of t he real exchange rate to out put .  The i mp a c t  of pol i t i cal i nst abil i t y on
unem pl oym ent   i s am biguous.
As   we   have alr eady not ed,  t he dynam i cs of  t he VAR  mi ght   be r i cher  t han i n our  simp l e i l l ust r ati ve 
m odel ,   so we   w oul d  not   wa n t   t o  use  t he  r elati onshi ps  bet w een t he  param eters i n  equat i on  ( 14)  as t he  basi s f or 
i dent i f i cati on of  str uct ural  equat i ons,   gi ven an esti ma t ed r educed f orm  VAR.   Ne v e r t hel ess,  t he simp l e m odel  
provi des  a basi s f or  i nt erpreti ng  such r educed f orm  r esult s.    The  r esult s are presented i n  t he  next   sub-secti on.13
4. 2  The  Econom et ric M odel
The  esti ma t ed VAR  i s presented i n  Tabl e 4.   Thi s quart erl y  VAR  i s esti ma t ed usi ng  t he  m acroeconom i c dat a 
di scussed i n Secti on 3 and publ i shed by t he I sraeli   Ce nt r al  Bur eau of  St ati sti cs ( CBS) ,   and t he pol i t i cal  dat a 
di scussed in Secti on 2 and publ i shed by t he  CBS a nd B’ Ts el em . Th e  VAR i ncl udes l ags of t he
m acroeconom i c vari ables ( l n(y),l n(u),l n(e))   up  t o  order  4;   t hi s l ag order  i s i ndi cated by  bot h  t he  Ak a i ke  and 
Schwar t z B ayesian informa t i on cri t eri a. Wi t h four lags, the sam pl e runs fr om  1988 t o 1999.  Th e  VAR i s 
condi t i oned on t he t hree poli t i cal  vari ables i n t he P- vector:l n(1+t k) (f atali t i es i n t he We s t   Bank and G aza),  
l n(1+i k)  ( I sraeli  f atali t i es) and ∆l n(c) ( t he grow t h rate of pri vat e resident i al const r uct i on i n Jew i sh
sett l em ents in t he W est  B ank and G aza areas).  Th e  VAR i ncl udes a si ngl e l ag of  each of  t hese vari ables. 
Si nce t he m ai n eff ect of the t wo  f atali t y seri es is li kel y t o be t hrough i t s eff ect on aggregate dem and,  and 
since accurate i nforma t i on  about   t he  m agni t ude  of  vi ol ent  clashes becom es avail able onl y  t wo   or  t hree m ont hs
aft er they occur,  the seri es appear wi t h a one-quart er  l ag.  ( Wh e n   t he cont em poraneous val ues of  t he t wo  
seri es are added t o t he r egression,   t hei r   coeff i cients are i nsi gni f i cant. )   The  r esident i al  const r uct i on stati sti cs 
r eport   t he  num ber  of  not i f i cati ons  t hat   const r uct i on  of  a bui l di ng  i s about   t o  start .   The  bui l di ngs  i n  Jew ish We s t  
Bank sett l em ents actual l y go up i n t he subsequent   quart er( s),   but   are probabl y at  or  near  com pleti on –  and 
vi sibl e t o Ar ab r esident s -  by t he t i me   t he stati sti cs are r eleased.  Choi ce of  an appropri ate l ag f or  t he  Dl n(c)
vari able is therefore som ew hat arbi t r ary.  In t he report ed equati ons a four-quart er  l ag i s used;   r esult s f r om  
usi ng t hree-  or  f i ve-quart er  l ags are simi l ar  t o  t he  ones  show n.   Al l   t hree pol i t i cal  vari ables are det r ended  usi ng 
a l i near  t r end.
The  VAR  model   s u mma r i zed by equat i on ( 13)  assum es t hat   t he P- vari ables are str ongl y  exogenous 
t o t he m acro-econom y.  The A ppendi x t o t hi s paper provi des som e support  for thi s assum pti on by show i ng 
t hat   t here i s no evidence wh a t soever  t hat   t he m acroeconom i c vari ables Gr anger- Ca us e   t he  P- vari ables.  Thi s 
r esult   i s consi stent  wi t h t hose of K haw aja [ 1993,   1995],   w ho uses panel   dat a on t he i nci dence of  upri sings i n 
di f f erent  part s of  t he  We s t   Bank  i n  order  t o  expl ore t he  det ermi nant s of  t he  i nt ensit y  of  t he  Inti f ada.   He   does
not  incl ude any expl i cit l y econom i c vari ables, but  is able to expl ain a l arge part  of the sam pl e vari ance by 
usi ng geographi cal characteri sti cs, t he i nt ensit y of past  acti vi t y by t he l ocal Israeli  securi t y forces, and
school i ng.   The  K haw aja r esult s suggest   t hat   t he i nt ensit y of  t he Inti f ada  has  depended  l argel y  on  social  and 
pol i t i cal  f actors r ather  t han  on  econom i c ones.
As   not ed i n Secti on 3,   i t   i s not   obvi ous t hat   t he det ermi ni sti c t r ends i n t he m acroeconom i c vari ables 
appeari ng i n equat i on (13) are li near.  W e have a choi ce betw een using a l i near tr end and som e nonl i near 
f i l t er.  A wi de range of fi l t ers produce very si mi l ar result s. We  t r i ed out  a H odri ck-Pr escott   f i l t er,   a cubi c 
spli ne fi l t er and a kernel  densi t y fi l t er (t he l ast two  u s i ng bandw i dt hs sel ected on t he basi s of generali zed 
cross-val i dat i on).   The  corr elati on coeff i cients f or  t he det r ended seri es usi ng t hese t hree alt ernat i ves are all   i n 
excess of  0. 95,   and  i t   ma k e s   very  l i t t l e di f f erence wh i ch i s used.   The  choi ce bet w een a l i near  t r end  and som e 
nonl i near fi l t er ma k e s  mo r e of a dif f erence, as il l ust r ated in Fi gure 5 above.  So t wo  s e t s of result s are 14
r eport ed i n t he paper.   A ppendi x Tabl e A2   r eport s r esult s usi ng a l i near  t r end;   Tabl e 4 bel ow  r eport s r esult s 
usi ng a H odri ck-Pr escott   fi l t er;  both sets of  r egressions i ncl ude seasonal  d u mmi es.  The  t wo   sets of  r esult s 
are qui t e simi l ar,  but  standard err ors in t he Tabl e 4 result s tend t o be a bi t  low er.  The f ol l ow i ng di scussion 
r elates t o  t he  esti ma t es presented i n  Tabl e 4.
The unrestr i cted V A R  esti ma t e incl udes m any i nsi gni f i cant coeff i cients and appears to be over-
param eteri zed. In order t o check the robust ness of t hose coeff i cients in t h e  VAR t hat  are signi f i cantl y
di f f erent fr om  zero,  we  a l so esti ma t ed a version i n w hi ch lags of indi vi dual  vari ables have been om i t t ed i n 
order  t o mi ni mi ze t he Schwar t z Ba ye s i an Cr i t eri on.   Thi s r estr i cted VAR  appears alongsi de t he unrestr i cted 
version.  The omi ssion of t he l ags does not  m ake a subst anti al di f f erence to t he si ze of t he si gni f i cant 
coeff i cients i n t he unrestr i cted VAR.
11  We   also esti ma t e t he  m odel   over  sub-sam ples om i t t i ng  t he  f i nal   t en or 
t we n t y observat i ons.  Tabl e 4 report s joi nt  F- t est stati sti cs for str uct ural changes in t he m odel  param eters, 
wh i ch are insi gni f i cant.
12 The t able also report s the coeff i cients on t he pol i t i cal inst abil i t y vari ables in t he 
out put  equat i on i n t he t wo  s u b - sam ples, wh i ch are all  negat i ve and i nsi gni f i cantl y di f f erent f r om  t he
coeff i cients i n  t he  w hol e sam ple. 
The  stati sti call y  signi f i cant  r educed f orm  i nt eracti ons  bet w een t he  t hree m acroeconom i c vari ables are 
consi stent  wi t h  t he  t heory  encapsulated i n  equat i on  ( 14).   The  r eal  exchange r ate i s posi t i vel y  r elated t o  l agged 
unem pl oym ent ,   t hough t he eff ect  i s i nsi gni f i cantl y di f f erent  f r om  zero i n t he steady state,  t he l n(e)  r egression
suggest i ng an eff ect vi a Dl n(u) t - 1.   Thi s i s consistent  wi t h a mo d e l   i n wh i ch hi gher  past   unem pl oym ent   l eads 
vi a a hysteresis eff ect to hi gher curr ent unem pl oym ent ,  low er curr ent out put  and a hi gher equi l i bri um  real 
exchange rate, an eff ect of m agni t ude  c h z ⋅ ⋅  in equat i on (14).  Conversely,  unem pl oym ent  is posi t i vel y 
r elated t o t he l agged r eal  exchange r ate,  wh i ch i s consi stent  wi t h a m odel   i n wh i ch r apid r eal  exchange r ate 
appreciati on can generate str uct ural unem pl oym ent ,  an eff ect of m agni t ude  y . U nem ploym ent  i s also
negat i vel y  r elated t o  l agged  i ncom e,   t hough  t hi s eff ect  t oo  i s i nsi gni f i cant  i n  t he  steady  state.  Thi s i s consi stent 
wi t h a m odel   i n wh i ch r educt i ons i n out put   can generate str uct ural  unem pl oym ent ,   an eff ect  of  m agni t ude j .
Fi nal l y,   out put   i s negat i vel y  r elated t o  t he  l agged  r eal  exchange r ate,  wh i ch i s consi stent  wi t h  t he  eff ect  of  r eal 
exchange r ate appreciati on on unem pl oym ent   t hat   has alr eady been not ed.  I n equat i on ( 13)  t hi s eff ect  has a 
m agni t ude y h⋅ .
The  VAR  also i ndi cates t he signi f i cance of  t he P- vari ables i n  t he  out put   equat i on.   Each of  t he  t hree 
vari ables has a negat i ve i m pact on out put .  They do not  appear signi f i cantl y i n ei t her of t he t wo  o t her 
equat i ons,   wi t h t he excepti on t hat   i n t he r estr i cted VAR  t he t - r ati o  on Dl n(c)  i ndi cates signi f i cance at  around 
t he 5%  l evel  i n t he unem pl oym ent   equat i on ( t he coeff i cient  i s posi t i ve,   wh i ch i s consi stent  wi t h t he negat i ve 
coeff i cient i n t he out put  equat i on).  As  i ndi cated in equat i on (14) t he eff ect of pol i t i cal i nst abil i t y on
unem pl oym ent  is am biguous a priori ,  and real exchange eff ects are li kel y t o be i nsi gni f i cant wh e n  z    ( t he 
i ncom e  elasti cit y  of  t he  exchange r ate)  i s sm all .15
The coeff i cients them sel ves do not  gi ve an i ndi cati on of the relati ve i m port ance of each poli t i cal 
i nst abil i t y vari able i n t he out put   equat i on,   so Tabl e 5 r eport s t he asym pt ot i c cum ulati ve i mp u l se responses of 
out put  and em pl oym ent  to a uni t  shock t o each of the t hree P- vari ables. The t able also not es the sam pl e 
standard devi ati on of  each vari able,  and t hus i ndi cates t he m agni t ude of  i m pul se r esponses t o a one standard 
devi ati on shock t o each of  t he P- vari ables.  I n  addi t i on  t o  t he  asym pt ot i c eff ects i ndi cated i n  Tabl e 5,   Fi gure 6 
i l l ust r ates t he dynam i cs of  a shock t o any of  t he P- vari ables by pl ot t i ng t he cum ulati ve i m pul se r esponse of 
out put   t o  a standard  devi ati on  shock  t o  each vari able.  The  f i gure  i ndi cates t hat   out put   converges  qui ckly  on  i t s 
asym pt ot e.
The  asym pt ot i c unem pl oym ent   eff ects j oi nt l y  are i nsi gni f i cantl y  di f f erent  f r om   zero,   but   t hi s i s not   t r ue 
of the asym pt ot i c out put  eff ects. A  uni t  shock t o t he W est  B ank and G aza fatali t y vari abl el n(1+t k)  wi l l  
r educe out put   by 1. 16% ,  ceteris pari bus.   A  simi l ar  shock t o t he I sraeli   f atali t y vari able l n(1+i k)  wi l l   r educe 
out put  by 0. 30% .  The corr espondi ng fi gures for standard devi ati on shocks are 1.28%  and 0. 30% .  A  uni t  
shock t o t he r ate of  grow t h of  pri vat e r esident i al  const r uct i on i n Jew ish sett l em ents i n t he We s t   Bank /   G aza 
areas wi l l   r educe out put   by  0. 57% ;   t he  corr espondi ng  f i gure f or  a standard  devi ati on  shock  i s 0. 35% .
Al t ernat i vel y,  w e can consider t he est i ma t ed eff ect on t he Israeli  econom y of indi vi dual  pol i t i cal 
episodes.   For   exam ple,  t he  t r end  i n  We s t   Bank  and  G aza f atali t i es up  t o  1999q4  ( t he  l ast  quart er  i n  our  f atali t y 
dat a set)   i mp l i es an expectati on of  16 f atali t i es i n 2000q4 ( t he t i me   of  wr i t i ng).   Cur r ent  r ough esti ma t es put  
t he actual   num ber  of  f atali t i es i n t hi s quart er  at  around 120.   Thi s devi ati on f r om  t he t r end i mp l i es a r ecession 
equi val ent to 5. 39%  of Israeli  GDP i n our esti ma t ed m odel .  W e shoul d not e that  thi s fi gure m ight  be an 
overesti ma t e,  because t here coul d be non-l i neari t i es i n t he pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y eff ects at  very hi gh l evels of  P
t hat  our relati vel y sm al l  sam ple cannot  pi ck up.  Ne v e r t hel ess, t he m odel  suggest s that  w e can expect 
subst anti al  r educt i ons  i n  GDP  w henever  vi ol ence f l ares up.
[Tabl e 5  and  Fi gure  6  here]
The r egression result s presented here suggest  two  s t yl i zed facts.  Fi r st,   t he pot enti al  “peace di vi dend” f r om  
bri ngi ng an end t o t he pol i t i cal  vi ol ence and i nst abil i t y i n I srael  i s subst anti al,   so t here i s an econom i c mo t i ve 
f or  devot i ng r esources t o pol i t i cal  stabil i zati on.   Second,   a l arge f r acti on of  t hi s di vi dend ari ses f r om   t he  costs 
of insecuri t y faced by Palesti ni ans, so a m ore D raconi an state securi t y pol i cy is unl i kel y t o bri ng econom i c 
benefi t s.  Such  benefi t s wi l l   onl y  accrue  as a r esult   of  a negot i ated sett l em ent.
5.   S u mma r y   and  Co nc l usi on
I n t hi s paper  we   have const r uct ed an econom et r i c m odel   com bini ng I sraeli   m acroeconom i c t i me   seri es dat a 
wi t h hi stori cal  seri es r efl ecti ng t he degree of  pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y i n t he count r y.   Sever al  of  t hese seri es have a 
quant i t ati vel y signi f i cant  i m pact  on t he m acro-econom y.  I n  part i cular,   econom i c perf orm ance i s r elated t o  t he 16
num ber of Pal esti ni ans and Israeli s kil l ed in pol i t i call y related viol ence and ti me  s e r i es relati ng t o A rab
percepti ons of insecuri t y (such as the rate of grow t h of Jew ish sett l em ents in t he W est  Bank).   Gr eater 
degrees of  vi ol ence and i nsecuri t y l ead t o poorer  perf orm ance.  The  i m pact  of  t he pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y vari ables 
appears to be l argel y t hrough out put  eff ects rather than em pl oym ent  or real exchange rate eff ects. For  
exam ple, we  e s t i ma t e that  a standard devi ati on i ncrease i n f atali t i es i n t he We s t   Bank and G aza,  r elati ve t o 
t he secular tr end i n fatali t i es, leads to a recession equi val ent to over 1%  of GDP.  A r educt i on i n pol i t i cal 
i nst abil i t y  i n  t he  l ong  t erm  i s t herefore i s l i kel y  t o  i mp r ove  I sraeli   econom i c perf orm ance subst anti all y.
The benefi t s of greater stabil i t y w i l l  depend on t he w ay i n w hi ch it  is achieved. The econom et r i c 
m odel   i ndi cates t hat   t he del eteri ous consequences of  t he Inti f ada  ari se part l y  f r om   t he  anti - I sraeli   vi ol ence of 
Pal esti ni an groups and part l y fr om  t he acti vi t y of the st ate and state securi t y m easures duri ng t he Inti f ada
peri od.   A  mo r e Dr aconi an securi t y  apparatus  mi ght   mi t i gat e t he  f orme r ,   but   at  t he  expense  of  aggravati ng  t he 
l att er.  Thi s m eans that  any subst anti al imp r ovem ent   i n econom i c perf orm ance f r om  greater  pol i t i cal  stabil i t y 
r equi r es t he  success of  t he  I sraeli - Pal esti ni an peace process. 
Appendi x:  G ranger- Ca us a l i t y  Te s t s f or  t he  Independence  of  Pol i t i cal  Instabi l i t y  Va r i abl es wi t h 
R espect  t o  M acroeconom ic Ti me   Series
The Gr anger- causali t y t ests are carr i ed out  as fol l ow s.  For  each ti me  s e r i es xt  = { l n(1+pk) t ,  ln(1+i k) t ,
Dl n(ct) t } we   esti ma t e a r egression  of  t he  f orm:
( A1 ) x t   =  n  0  +  S  i   [ n1  i   · x t - i   +  m1 i· l n(y)t - i   +  m2 i· l n(u) t - i   +  m3 i· l n(e)t - i ] +    ut
wh e r e i = 1, …, N.  As  l ong as t here is no evi dence of seri al corr elati on i n t he residualut  F-t ests are 
const r uct ed f or  ( i )   t he j oi nt   signi f i cance of  all   t he mj it oget her,   and ( i i )   t he j oi nt   signi f i cance of  t he m1i,   t he  m2i
and t he m3i  i ndi vi dual l y.   Ther e i s no N  f or  wh i ch any of  t hese F-t est  stati sti cs i s signi f i cant.   Tabl e A1   r eport s 
t he  p-val ues  of  t he  F-t ests f or  N  =  1  and  N  =  4.
[Tabl es A1- A2  here]17
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Table 1: Standard Deviations of the De-trended Quarterly Time Series
period    using Hodrick-    using linear
  Prescott Filter trend














Table 2: Unit Root Test Statistics for Quarterly Macroeconomic Variables
variable sample period p-value lag order
ln(y) 1980-99 0.009 8
ln(u) 1986-99 0.056 4
ln(e) 1987-99 0.047 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3: Unit Root Test Statistics for Quarterly Political Instability
Variables*
variable sample period p-value lag order
ln(1+ik) 1987-99 0.000 0
ln(1+tk) 1987-99 0.000 0
ln(c) 1987-99 0.282 1
Dln(c) 1987-99 0.000 0
* Except for Dln(ct) the null is that the series is a random walk with drift and the 
alternative is that it is stationary around a linear trend. For Dln(ct) the null is that 
the series is a random walk and the alternative is that it is stationary around a constant.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------20
Table 4: The Estimated VAR Model (Quarterly Sample, 1988-99)
unrestricted VAR   restricted VAR
ln(e) equation (σ = 0.01822, RSS = 0.00863)
variable   coeff. std. err. t ratio h.c.s.e.   coeff. std. err. t ratio h.c.s.e.
ln(e)t-1  0.46895  0.18902  2.481 0.16057  0.56947  0.09427  6.041
0.08647
ln(e)t-2  0.19120  0.20623  0.927 0.16197
ln(e)t-3 -0.05295  0.20342 -0.260 0.17281
ln(e)t-4 -0.18645  0.17610 -1.059 0.18151
ln(y)t-1  0.18931  0.17560  1.078 0.14115
ln(y)t-2 -0.23996  0.22004 -1.091 0.15784
ln(y)t-3 -0.23790  0.20832 -1.142 0.17186
ln(y)t-4  0.10106  0.19596  0.516 0.20163
ln(u)t-1  0.12949  0.05652  2.291 0.06280  0.12273  0.03960  3.099
0.05165
ln(u)t-2 -0.19669  0.06280 -3.132 0.08243 -0.19743  0.03961 -4.984
0.05365
ln(u)t-3  0.04262  0.07173  0.594 0.05990
ln(u)t-4 -0.05420  0.06096 -0.889 0.06402
?ln(c)/100  0.26650  0.60673  0.439 0.70373
ln(1+ik)/100  0.06546  0.30866  0.212 0.33106
ln(1+tk)/100 -0.52924  0.48869 -1.083 0.44974
ln(y) equation (σ = 0.01273, RSS = 0.00421)
variable   coeff. std. err. t ratio h.c.s.e.   coeff. std. err. t ratio h.c.s.e.
ln(e)t-1  0.18247  0.13204  1.382 0.12089  0.23063  0.06496  3.550
0.04944
ln(e)t-2 -0.11059  0.14407 -0.768 0.14861
ln(e)t-3  0.16704  0.14211  1.175 0.12697
ln(e)t-4 -0.53869  0.12302 -4.379 0.11339 -0.39582 0.07252 -5.458
0.07277
ln(y)t-1  0.24850  0.12267  2.026 0.12694  0.21482  0.09857  2.179
0.10154
ln(y)t-2  0.11252  0.15372  0.732 0.12096
ln(y)t-3 -0.05729  0.14553 -0.394 0.13859
ln(y)t-4 -0.29243  0.13689 -2.136 0.13668 -0.21944 0.09139 -2.401
0.09293
ln(u)t-1  0.05573  0.03948  1.411 0.0375021
ln(u)t-2  0.00129  0.04387  0.029 0.04087
ln(u)t-3 -0.01845  0.05011 -0.368 0.04720
ln(u)t-4 -0.02389  0.04259 -0.561 0.03727
?ln(c)/100 -1.20210  0.42384 -2.836 0.44060 -0.94279  0.35683 -2.642
0.37022
ln(1+ik)/100 -0.47766  0.21563 -2.215 0.21488 -0.30852  0.18643 -1.655
0.19171
ln(1+tk)/100 -1.31210  0.34139 -3.843 0.31304 -1.20960  0.27953 -4.327
0.2676522
Table 4 (Continued)
unrestricted VAR   restricted VAR
ln(u) equation (σ = 0.06261, RSS = 0.10191)
variable   coeff. std. err. t ratio h.c.s.e.   coeff. std. err. t ratio h.c.s.e.
ln(e)t-1  1.01760  0.64935  1.567 0.77656  1.10220  0.37872  2.910
0.35600
ln(e)t-2  0.54733  0.70850  0.773 0.61367
ln(e)t-3 -0.09520  0.69884 -0.136 0.65053
ln(e)t-4 -0.00930  0.60498 -0.015 0.33584
ln(y)t-1 -1.87760  0.60327 -3.112 0.62075 -2.01690  0.50315 -4.009
0.56216
ln(y)t-2  0.33187  0.75595  0.439 0.66223
ln(y)t-3  0.85415  0.71568  1.193 0.72905  1.62860  0.51232  3.179
0.47421
ln(y)t-4  0.24214  0.67320  0.360 0.55682
ln(u)t-1  0.69470  0.19417  3.578 0.21674  0.56423  0.10385  5.433
0.13766
ln(u)t-2 -0.23539  0.21573 -1.091 0.18155
ln(u)t-3  0.27122  0.24643  1.101 0.27448  0.34396  0.12097  2.843
0.13669
ln(u)t-4  0.23018  0.20942  1.099 0.17880
?ln(c)/100  2.92600  2.08440  1.404 1.73480  3.46640  1.75040  1.980
1.82590
ln(1+ik)/100 -1.79170  1.06040 -1.690 1.01720
ln(1+tk)/100  0.04864  1.67890  0.029 1.57040
ARCH Tests     e     y     e
order 4: F(4,18)  0.50415 [0.7332]  1.50870 [0.2416]  0.15063 [0.9603]
order 1: F(1,24)  1.53710 [0.2270]  3.41310 [0.0770]  0.32421 [0.5744]
Residual Autocorrelation Tests (System): order 4: F(36,36) = 0.66796 [0.8846], order 1: F(9,51) = 0.70880 [0.6981]
Residual Correlations: (e,y) = -0.11783, (e,u) = 0.13201, (y,u) = 0.20222
Log-likelihood = 540.15, R²(LM) = 0.75901
Parameter Constancy Forecast Tests
Last 20 periods: F(60,6)  = 1.78170 [0.2407]
Last 10 periods: F(30,16) = 1.38370 [0.2497]23
Selected coefficients in the ln(y) equation in sub-samples
 Sample less last 10 periods  Sample less last 20 periods
variable   coeff. std. err. t ratio h.c.s.e.   coeff. std. err. t ratio h.c.s.e
?ln(c)/100 -0.79312  0.59022 -1.344 0.64353 -1.36340  0.63200 -2.157 0.63181
ln(1+ik)/100 -0.50814     0.30981 -1.640 0.28088 -1.15410  0.54826 -2.105
0.49497
ln(1+tk)/100 -1.35040     0.46697 -2.892 0.43620 -1.45440  0.79711 -1.825
0.8982724
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 5: Asymptotic Cumulative Impulse Responses to Unit Shocks
Responses are measured in %; figures in parenthesis are standard errors.
ln(1+ik)       ln(1+tk) ∆ln(c)
ln(u)  0.405          1.590           13.026
(0.663)        (2.449)          (8.101)
ln(y) -0.296 -1.159 -0.567
(0.181)        (0.302)          (0.504)
s.d.*  1.023          1.103            0.61
indpendent
variable
* These standard deviations are for the detrended independent variables.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Appendix Table A1: Granger-Causality Test Statistics
lag order dep. variable all 3 ln(e) ln(y) ln(u)
N = 4  ln(1+ik) 0.993 0.885 0.960 0.994
N = 1  ln(1+ik) 0.999 0.891 0.971 0.996
N = 4  ln(1+tk) 0.680 0.629 0.715 0.255
N = 1  ln(1+tk) 0.846 0.513 0.707 0.545
N = 4  ∆ln(c) 0.893 0.757 0.484 0.882





The VAR Model Using Linearly Detrended Macroeconomic Time Series
ln(e) equation (σ = 0.01972, RSS = 0.01011)
variable   coeff.     std. err.    t ratio      prob.     h.c.s.e.
ln(e)t-1  0.65671      0.18293      3.590      0.0013
0.14577
ln(e)t-2  0.22385      0.22302      1.004      0.3248     0.17787
ln(e)t-3 -0.09740      0.21723 -0.448      0.6576     0.19260
ln(e)t-4 -0.26407      0.17464 -1.512      0.1426     0.17002
ln(y)t-1  0.24270      0.16742      1.450      0.1591     0.12048
ln(y)t-2 -0.30768      0.23303 -1.320      0.1982     0.18700
ln(y)t-3 -0.17717      0.21665 -0.818      0.4209     0.18613
ln(y)t-4  0.12672      0.19820      0.639      0.5282    0.23731
ln(u)t-1  0.12483      0.05678      2.199      0.0370     0.05986
ln(u)t-2 -0.18922      0.06728 -2.812      0.0092     0.09187
ln(u)t-3  0.06139      0.07658      0.802      0.4301     0.05948
ln(u)t-4 -0.01937      0.06024 -0.322      0.7504     0.05755
ln(1+ik)/100  0.38220      0.33151      1.152      0.2597     0.34299
ln(1+pk)/100 -0.84323      0.58684 -1.437      0.1627     0.58662
∆ln(c)/100 -0.09036      0.66197 -0.137      0.8925     0.82469
ln(y) equation (σ = 0.01828, RSS = 0.00868)
variable   coeff.     std. err.    t ratio      prob.     h.c.s.e.
ln(e)t-1  0.26559      0.16957      1.566      0.1294     0.15334
ln(e)t-2 -0.09727      0.20673 -0.471      0.6419     0.21275
ln(e)t-3  0.14204      0.20136      0.705      0.4868     0.13407
ln(e)t-4 -0.32967      0.16188 -2.036      0.0520     0.16451
ln(y)t-1  0.55578 0.15519      3.581      0.0014     0.16143
ln(y)t-2  0.06257      0.21601      0.290      0.7744     0.21244
ln(y)t-3  0.12540      0.20083      0.624      0.5378     0.21714
ln(y)t-4 -0.01405      0.18372 -0.076      0.9396     0.16440
ln(u)t-1 -0.01608      0.05263 -0.306      0.7624     0.05235
ln(u)t-2  0.03858      0.06237      0.619      0.5415     0.05778
ln(u)t-3 -0.03345      0.07099 -0.471      0.6414     0.07459
ln(u)t-4 0.05177      0.05584      0.927      0.3625     0.06186
ln(1+ik)/100 -0.16988      0.30730 -0.553      0.5851     0.29034
ln(1+pk)/100 -1.48590      0.54397 -2.732      0.0112     0.52437
∆ln(c)/100 -1.56470      0.61361 -2.550      0.0170     0.58966
ln(u) equation (σ = 0.06272, RSS = 0.10226)
variable   coeff.     std. err.    t ratio      prob.     h.c.s.e.
ln(e)t-1  1.11630      0.58187      1.919      0.0661     0.80681
ln(e)t-2  0.57113      0.70940      0.805      0.4281     0.55794
ln(e)t-3 -0.01655      0.69096 -0.024      0.9811     0.65214
ln(e)t-4 -0.16312      0.55551 -0.294      0.7714     0.35208
ln(y)t-1 -2.24060      0.53253 -4.208      0.0003     0.60872
ln(y)t-2  0.35799      0.74125      0.483      0.6332     0.68010
ln(y)t-3  0.66083      0.68914      0.959      0.3464     0.69576
ln(y)t-4  0.05890      0.63045      0.093 0.9263     0.53060
ln(u)t-1  0.77365      0.18059      4.284      0.0002     0.19042
ln(u)t-2 -0.32836      0.21401 -1.534      0.1370     0.19934
ln(u)t-3  0.34395      0.24360      1.412      0.1698     0.29416
ln(u)t-4  0.17798      0.19160      0.929      0.3615     0.14245
ln(1+ik)/100 -2.52990      1.05450 -2.399      0.0239     0.93103
ln(1+pk)/100 -0.14218      1.86660 -0.076      0.9399     1.83720
∆ln(c)/100  3.75910      2.10560      1.785      0.0859     1.88030
Residual Correlations: (e,y) = -0.02670, (e,u) = 0.15612, (y,u)= -0.05695
Log-likelihood = 519.06, R²(LM) = 0.82517526
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Fi gure 1:   The  pol i t i cal  t i me   seri es26







Fi gure 2:   Qu a r t erl y  Ra t e of  Gr ow t h  of  t he  I sraeli   Consum er  Pr i ce I ndex









Fi gure 3:   Logari t hm   of  t he  I sraeli   No mi nal   Tr ade-We i ght ed Exchange Ra t e,
Wi t h  Tar get   Bands27








Fi gure 4:   l n(y)    ( l ogari t hm   of  r eal  GDP)   and  i t s H odri ck-Pr escott   t r end
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Fi gure 6:   Cumul ati ve  i m pul se r esponses  of  l n(y)  and l n(u)  t o  a one  s.d.   i ncrease i n  each condi t i oni ng  vari able ( usi ng  r estr i cted VAR  coeff i cients)29
No t es
1.  Ther e is a closel y related li t erature exam ini ng cross-count r y vari ati ons i n i nvest me n t  
perf orm ance.  A  paper  by A l esi na and Per ot t i   [ 1993]  expl ains such vari ati ons by usi ng a "sociopol i t i cal 
i nst abil i t y i ndex" const r uct ed using pri nci pal  com ponent s analysi s. The i m port ant factors in t he i ndex 
are indi cators of the absence of dem ocracy and the i nci dence of pol i t i cal vi ol ence.  Ko r m endi   and 
M egui r e [1985] and de H aan and Si erm ann [1996] di scover a negat i ve cross-count r y corr elati on 
bet w een t he  i nvest me n t - GDP  r ati o  and  i ndi ces of  pol i t i cal  f r eedom .
2.  On e  s e r i ous probl em  w it h t he panel  dat a regressions i s the di f f i cult y i np r oduci ng an 
unbi ased esti ma t e of  t hi s m ean val ue.   See Pesar an and  Sm i t h  [ 1995].
3.   Al l   pl ace nam es  are purely  geographi cal  and  have  no  geopol i t i cal  i mp l i cati ons.
4.  Of  course the consequences of the Inti f ada shoul d be m easured i n t erms   of  t he ensuing 
hum an costs.  The  poi nt   of  t hi s paper  i s t o  show   t hat   t hese  costs are not   confi ned  j ust   t o  t hose  suff eri ng 
personal   i nj ury or  l oss of  propert y as a r esult   of  vi ol ent  acti on by I sraeli   and Pal esti ni an f orces.  I srael 
as a w hol e suff ers f r om   greater  povert y.
5.  The  t erm  "A rab I sraeli s" r efers t o t hose Ar abs wi t h I sraeli   nat i onal i t y and r i ght   of  abode i n 
I srael  proper.
6.  Fi gures before 1990 are report ed onl y annual l y;  t he quart erl y fi gures for 1988-9 are 
i nt erpol ati ons  usi ng  t he  me t hod  of  Li sm an and  Sandee [ 1964].
7.  The dat a used in t hi s secti on are draw n fr om  t he Israeli  Ce nt r al Bur eau of St ati sti cs 
M ont hl y Bul l eti n.   Fur t her  det ail s are avail able on  r equest .
8.   The  we i ght s are t he  sam e as i n  t he  off i cial  I sraeli   exchange r ate basket .
9.   We   di d t r y out   an al t ernat i ve  version  of  t he  m odel   i n  t he  next   secti on  t hat   used l n(y),∆l n(u)
and ∆l n(e).  Thi s m odel  exhi bi t ed signs of over- di f f erencing:  in part i cular,  coeff i cients on t he l agged 
dependent   vari ables i n  equat i ons  f or  t he  di f f erenced seri es t ended  t o  sum  t o  l ess t han - 1.
10.   Thi s second characteri sti c prevents i dent i f i cati on of  t he str uct ural  m odel   along t he l i nes of 
Bl anchard  and  Qu a h   [ 1989].
11.  The unrestr i cte d  VAR i s esti ma t ed by O LS.  Each equati on i ncl udes i dent i cal RHS
vari ables,  so t hi s i s equi val ent  t o t he Ma x i mu m  Li kel i hood esti ma t or.   The  r estr i cted VAR  i s esti ma t ed 
by  num eri cal  opt i mi zati on  of  t he  l og-l i kel i hood f unct i on.
12.   The  t est  stati sti c i s equi val ent  t o h2  i n  D oorni k  and  H endry  [ 1997,   p.   199].